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Grounded theories assume that there is no central module for cognition. According to
this view, all cognitive phenomena, including those considered the province of amodal
cognition such as reasoning, numeric, and language processing, are ultimately grounded
in (and emerge from) a variety of bodily, affective, perceptual, and motor processes.
The development and expression of cognition is constrained by the embodiment of
cognitive agents and various contextual factors (physical and social) in which they are
immersed. The grounded framework has received numerous empirical confirmations.
Still, there are very few explicit computational models that implement grounding in
sensory, motor and affective processes as intrinsic to cognition, and demonstrate that
grounded theories can mechanistically implement higher cognitive abilities. We propose
a new alliance between grounded cognition and computational modeling toward a novel
multidisciplinary enterprise: Computational Grounded Cognition. We clarify the defining
features of this novel approach and emphasize the importance of using the methodology
of Cognitive Robotics, which permits simultaneous consideration of multiple aspects of
grounding, embodiment, and situatedness, showing how they constrain the development
and expression of cognition.
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INTRODUCTION
Grounded theories increasingly challenge tradi-
tional views of cognition by proposing that the
conceptual representations underlying knowl-
edge are grounded in sensory and motor
systems, rather than being represented and pro-
cessed abstractly in amodal conceptual data
structures.
The grounded perspective offers a uni-
fying view of cognition. It stresses dynamic
brain-body-environment interactions and
perception-action links as the common bases
of simple behaviors as well as complex cog-
nitive and social skills, without ontological
(or representational) separations between
these domains (Spivey, 2007; Barsalou, 2008;
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Glenberg, 2010). Historically the grounded
perspective has mainly targeted psychological
phenomena. However, it aligns well with
current theories in neuroscience that emphasize
a continuity between the neuronal circuits
that solve essential problems of action speci-
fication and selection in early organisms, and
those that solve more elaborated problems in
humans (cf. Shadlen et al., 2008; Cisek and
Kalaska, 2010). Furthermore, the debate on the
embodied nature of brain and cognition has a
substantial impact on many other disciplines,
including philosophy, linguistics, the social
sciences, and robotics (Verschure et al., 2003;
Pfeifer and Bongard, 2006; Clark, 2008).
Despite its growing popularity, the full
potential of this methodology has not yet been
demonstrated; and this is not only a matter
of obtaining new empirical demonstrations of
the importance of grounding for cognition.
The framework is empirically well-established,
but the theories are relatively underspecified. A
real breakthrough might result from the real-
ization of explicit computational models that
implement grounding in sensory, motor and
affective processes as intrinsic to cognition. In
this article, we propose a new alliance between
grounded cognition theories and computa-
Grounded Cognition
Grounded theories of cognition assume
that all cognitive phenomena, including
those traditionally considered the
province of amodal cognition such as
reasoning, numeric, and language
processing, are ultimately grounded in
(and emerge from) a variety of bodily,
affective, perceptual and motor
processes.
tional modeling designed to work toward the
realization of a novel multidisciplinary enter-
prise: Computational Grounded Cognition.
Computational Grounded Cognition
The fusion and cross-fertilization
between grounded cognition theories,
computational modeling, and cognitive
robotics methods. The goal of
Computational Grounded Cognition is
developing process models of how
grounded phenomena originate during
(human and animal) development and
learning and how they are expressed in
on-line processing.
WHAT IS GROUNDED COGNITION ABOUT? A
FIELD MAP
Grounded and embodied theories of cognition
have become popular by stressing “the role of
the body in cognition” (e.g., body orientation
in relation to spatial processing or metaphor-
ical reasoning, cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).
However, the scope of these theories is presently
much wider and thus the literal meaning of the
term “embodied cognition” is too narrow.
As shown in Figure 1, grounded cognition
is the name of a methodological approach to
the study of cognition, which describes it as
“grounded in multiple ways, including simula-
tions, situated action, and, on occasion, bod-
ily states” (Barsalou, 2008, pp. 619). Grounded
cognition theories are bases for studying how
knowledge and concepts are grounded in the
modalities and bodily states, how cognitive pro-
cesses such as language and thought are rooted
in the body’s interactions with the physical and
social environment, and how situated simula-
tions and the re-enactment of perceptual, motor
and affective processes can support abstract
thought.
Ultimately, the promise of grounded theo-
ries of cognition is to explain behavioral and
experimental patterns in all of the traditional
provinces of cognition (e.g., attention, memory,
reasoning, and language) without recourse to a
central module, showing instead that these pat-
terns emerge from all of the systems in the brain,
the body, and the environment (see the arrows
pointing to the “Classic Cognition” domain in
Figure 1). Below we provide five examples of
grounded phenomena chosen for illustrative
purposes.
1. Barsalou and collaborators (Niedenthal et al.,
2005; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011) have
documented that the acquisition of concep-
tual knowledge about emotions requires the
embodiment of the corresponding bodily,
affective, and emotional states. The same
emotional states are re-enacted when emo-
tion knowledge is used to perceive, recog-
nize, and interpret the emotions of self and
others. Niedenthal et al. (2005) discuss sev-
eral other examples of social embodiment
of attitudes, social perception, and emotion.
(see also Ferri et al., 2010).
2. A significant example of embodiment sig-
natures in cognition is attention deploy-
ment, which plays a central role in forming
concepts and directing reasoning within a
grounded cognition framework. For exam-
ple, Grant and Spivey (2003) found that
people who were about to solve a difficult
diagram-based insight problem (Duncker’s
Tumor-and-Lasers problem) tended to pro-
duce subtly different eye-movement patterns
compared to people who were about to give
up on the problem. Those particular eye
movements were part and parcel of the cog-
nitive insight process itself, revealing that
these people were about to discover the solu-
tion. In a second experiment, Grant and
Spivey implicitly induced those eye move-
ments in a new group of participants, and the
number of people achieving insight doubled.
Thus, the high-speed perception-action loop
produced by eye movements (where an eye
movement to an object influences both cog-
nition and the next eye movement to another
object, and so on) constitutes a sensorimo-
tor ordering of micro-cognitive states from
which high-level reasoning can emerge, such
as abstract insight into a difficult puzzle.
3. Embodiment exerts its influence during
development. Yu and Smith (2012) report
that young learners solve the hard problem of
learning object names by using an embodied
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FIGURE 1 | Grounded cognition: a field map.
strategy. Essentially, their hand, head and eye
movements help to stabilize attention on a
selected target, thus reducing competition
in the visual field and ultimately supporting
word learning.
4. The importance of the linkage between visual
and motor processes is well-demonstrated
by the stimulus-response compatibility effect
(Tucker and Ellis, 2001; Ellis et al., 2007).
These studies demonstrate that when we
perform visual categorization tasks (e.g.,
identifying artifact vs. natural objects), the
micro-affordances linked to the objects (e.g.,
power grasp for a large apple or precision
grip for a small cherry) affect visual catego-
rization performance, even if they are irrel-
evant for the task. This suggests that seeing
an object automatically evokes motor pro-
grams appropriate to deal with it. Glenberg
and Kaschak (2002) have provided additional
demonstrations of action-compatibility effects
(ACE), such as faster response times when
the action used for reporting a choice is con-
gruent with the context in which the action
is typically used, or with the semantics and
pragmatics of linguistic stimuli. This latter
evidence suggests that even linguistic pro-
cessing might be grounded in action (see also
Glenberg, 2010).
5. Finger counting (see Figure 2) is used
throughout the world to acquire concep-
tual knowledge about numbers. Historically,
several cultures chose number symbols that
resembled hand and finger shapes. Recently,
the influence of finger counting habits on
adult number processing was documented by
Fischer (2008) and Domahs et al. (2010).
Note that we do not consider these (and
other) grounding phenomena as optional add-
ons of an overall amodal cognition, but con-
stitutive of it. For instance, we do not assume
that affective states modulate an amodal cogni-
tive categorization process, but that they actually
constitute the categorization, and thus are nec-
essary for it (Niedenthal et al., 2005). This is
a key difference between the grounded view
and alternative theories that assign embodied
phenomena a limited role in “true” cogni-
tion (e.g., those that assume amodal process-
ing plus some contextual modulation), or those
that assume a one-directional leakage from
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FIGURE 2 | Numerical cognition can be grounded
in bodily actions.
central amodal processing to the sensorimo-
tor peripheries (Mahon and Caramazza, 2008).
Further elaborations and distinctions, such as
that between on-line and off-line embodiment,
are discussed in Myachykov et al. (2013, unpub-
lished).
GROUNDING, EMBODIMENT, AND SITUATEDNESS:
A CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION
Grounded theories of cognition are often
defined in contrast to traditional cognitive sci-
ence (e.g., denying representation in terms of
amodal symbols, and rejecting accounts of cog-
nitive processing in terms of arbitrary symbolic
manipulations), or reduced to a slogan (e.g.,
“the body plays a role in cognition”). The recent
proliferation of grounded theories, which are
often associated with different claims and per-
spectives (Wilson, 2002), has lead to a confusing
usage of terms such as “grounded,” “embod-
ied,” and “situated.” Like in Barsalou (2008), we
use the term “grounding” as a suitcase word to
define the field. Furthermore, as cognition can
be grounded in multiple ways, it is often neces-
sary to formulate more specific hypotheses, such
as clarifying whether a cognitive process is influ-
enced by a bodily state, a situated simulation,
or both. For this, we propose that the effects
of grounding, embodiment, and situatedness
can be conceptualized as a cascade and have
additive effects on cognition and representation
(see Figure 3).
Below we give some examples of grounding,
embodiment, and situatedness in the domain
of numerical cognition. This domain is chosen
because it has been considered as a domain par
excellence for abstract and amodal concepts, a
view we wish to challenge.
FIGURE 3 | Grounding, embodiment and
situatedness: a cascade of effects on cognition.
Grounding
Cognition has a physical foundation and is
shaped by physical properties of the world, such
as gravity, celestial light sources, and the laws
of physics. Grounding of numerical cognition is
reflected in the universal association of smaller
numbers with lower space and larger numbers
with upper space (Ito and Hatta, 2004; Schwarz
and Keus, 2004), which reflects the physical
necessity that aggregating more objects makes
larger piles. Alternatively, grounding could be
expressed through the perception of the cardi-
nality of a set (Stoianov and Zorzi, 2012 and
references therein) which natively supports fun-
damental cognitive operations.
Embodiment
Embodied representations are shaped by
physical constraints of an individual’s body.
These sensory-motor experiences are structured
according to physical principles that provide
the grounding of cognition. Therefore, unusual
bodies create unusual minds (Casasanto, 2011;
Keehner and Fischer, 2012), and systematic
use of one’s body also influences the cognitive
representation of numbers. Consider the fact
that small/large numbers are responded to
faster with the left/right hand. This SNARC
effect (spatial-numerical association of response
codes) is weaker in people who start counting
on the fingers of their right hand (Fischer,
2008; Lindemann et al., 2011), presumably
because right-starters have initially learned
to associate small numbers with their right
side. Importantly, it becomes clear that indi-
vidual differences (physical and experiential)
modulate this component of the SNARC
effect.
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Situatedness
Situated cognition refers to the context-
Cognitive Robotics
The field of robotics that takes
inspiration from theories of human
and animal cognition to endow robots
with comparable cognitive abilities.
Cognitive robotics ultimately aims at
realizing intelligent and embodied
systems (robots) that make decisions
and take actions autonomously in
realistic environments, including social
(human-robot and robot-robot)
scenarios.
dependence of cognitive processing, that is,
to current constraints and task demands. Two
examples illustrate how the specific situation
further modulates the grounded and embodied
representation of numbers (see also Fischer
et al., 2009, 2010): first, a given number is
associated with left or right space, depending on
the number range tested (Dehaene et al., 1993).
Second, turning one’s head to the left/right
induces the production of smaller/larger
random numbers (Loetscher et al., 2008).
TOWARD A COMPUTATIONAL GROUNDED
COGNITION
For grounded cognition theories to improve
their explanatory scope, it is necessary to
develop (better) process models of how grounded
phenomena originate during development and
learning and how they are expressed in on-line
processing. Some examples of fruitful cross-
fertilization between grounded cognition and
computational modeling studies exist already
(see e.g., Cangelosi and Riga, 2006; Spivey, 2007;
Schöner, 2008; Hope et al., 2010; Pezzulo and
Calvi, 2011), but the field would greatly bene-
fit from an integrative effort: a Computational
Grounded Cognition initiative.
Given that computational modeling has been
around for a long time, what is special about
Computational Grounded Cognition? Below we
discuss this issue. First, we summarize the
most important elements that grounded com-
putational models should incorporate (see also
Pezzulo et al., 2011). Second, we emphasize the
importance of adopting Cognitive Robotics as a
research methodology.
KEY ASSUMPTIONS OF GROUNDED
COMPUTATIONAL MODELS
Grounded computational modeling requires
constructing models in which cognition is
deeply interrelated with sensorimotor action
and affect, and cognitive abilities emerge from
the interactions between sub-processes rather
than being implemented in isolated “cog-
nitive modules.” Thus, the cognitive algo-
rithms for word reading, speech recogni-
tion, object recognition, action understand-
ing, and problem-solving should incorporate
information from perceptual, motor, and affec-
tive processes when producing their results,
and this is seldom seen in current computa-
tional models. This design method demands
an integrative approach, which can be called
“interactionism,” in which cognition stems
Interactionism
A theoretical framework in the
cognitive and neural sciences that
places emphasis on how a given
cognitive process (e.g., language,
memory, numerical processing)
emerges from the interaction between
multiple subsystems rather than from
the operation of an individual module
devoted to that process.
from “coordinated non-cognition” (Barsalou
et al., 2007).
Modal vs. amodal representations
According to grounded theories, cognition is
supported by modal representations and asso-
ciated mechanisms for their processing (e.g.,
situated simulations), rather than amodal repre-
sentations, transductions, and abstract rule sys-
tems. Recent computational models of sensory
processing can be used to study the ground-
ing of internal representations in sensorimotor
modalities; for example, generative models show
that useful representations can self-organize
through unsupervised learning (Hinton, 2007).
However, modalities are usually not isolated
but form integrated and multimodal assem-
blies, plausibly in association areas or “conver-
gence zones” (Damasio, 1989; Simmons and
Barsalou, 2003). Furthermore, during learn-
ing strong interdependences among sensory
and motor representations are established that
incorporate sensory regularities created by an
agent’s actions, forming sensorimotor contin-
gencies (O’Regan and Noe, 2001) or emulators
(Grush, 2004). Similarly, theories of active per-
ception emphasize that sensory stimuli are not
experienced passively but gathered actively, and
action deployment structures the way people
develop sensory representations. For example,
Held and Hein (1963) showed that if cats expe-
rience the world only passively, they develop
suboptimal perceptual representations. An open
research objective is incorporating these ideas in
computational models that realize the simulta-
neous grounding of representations in multiple
modalities as well as across sensory, motor and
affective processes.
One computational method for integrating
modalities is designing robot controllers com-
posed of multiple, interlinked modal maps (e.g.,
Kohonen’s, 2001 self-organizing maps, or pop-
ulation codes, Ma et al., 2006; Morse et al.,
2010). These might include motor maps, visual
maps, and auditory maps, with the goal of
investigating how they combine to support cog-
nitive processing. This approach has recently
been taken by Rucinski et al. (2011) when
implementing the SNARC effect in a humanoid
robot. Generative models can be used as well
to explain multimodality and top-down influ-
ences (e.g., from motor or reward to sensory
representations).
Another open research question concerns
the hierarchical structure of association areas
and the interaction of bottom-up activation
vs. top-down simulation processes (Friston,
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2010), which potentially permits conceptual
knowledge to exert influence on sensorimotor
processes.
From sensorimotor experience to cognitive skills:
abstraction and abstract thought on the top of a
modal system
Grounded computational models should not
come pre-equipped with (arbitrary) representa-
tions. Instead, they should acquire “grounded
modal symbols” through development and sen-
sorimotor interaction, with genetic constraints
presumably also playing a role. Furthermore,
grounded computational models should
acquire advanced cognitive abilities and abstract
thought on top of their modal systems, not
in separate subsystems. In other words, not
only should representations be grounded in
the modalities, but also their processing should
be fully embodied, such that there is no cen-
tral processing independent of sensorimotor
processes and/or affective experience.
Figure 4 sketches an initial proposal for
a “multi-modal processor” that can poten-
tially implement cognitive and symbolic oper-
ations in modal systems (rather than with
amodal symbols). First, grounded models are
based on situated interaction of the robot
with its environment, which can include both
robots and humans. These multimodal sym-
bols integrate perceptual, motor and valence
information. Second, cognitive processing prin-
cipally involves situated simulation, which is the
re-enactment of grounded symbols (Barsalou,
1999). Cognition thus involves constraints that
are similar to those in overt action because rel-
evant episodic representations and associated
bodily resources and sensorimotor strategies are
activated.
Situated simulations may also support cog-
nitive processing of objects or events in
their absence. This can range from delib-
erate forms of imagery (Kosslyn, 1980) to
automatic, unconscious processing (Jeannerod,
2001, 2006). Forms of action simulation and
mental imagery have been linked to compre-
hension, reasoning, prospection, object catego-
rization, action recognition, and other com-
plex cognitive tasks (Glenberg, 1997; Jeannerod,
2006; Hassabis and Maguire, 2009; Moulton
and Kosslyn, 2009; Schacter et al., 2012).
These studies support simulation as a core
process, which can both recreate experiences
and productively recombine them, resulting in
novel and prospective experiences, ultimately
supporting off-line cognition without amodal
representations.
An important challenge is explaining how
abstract concepts and symbolic capabilities can
be constructed from grounded categorical rep-
resentations, situated simulations and embod-
ied processes. It has been suggested that abstract
concepts could be based principally on inte-
roceptive, meta-cognitive and affective states
(Barsalou, 2008) and that selective attention
and categorical memory integration are essen-
tial for creating a symbolic system (Barsalou,
2003). Grounded computational models can
help better specifying and testing these initial
proposals.
Realistic linkage of cognitive processes with the
body, the environment, and brain dynamics
In grounded cognition theories, cognitive pro-
cessing in even abstract domains depends on
sensorimotor skills and bodily resources. This
leads to the possibility that expressions like “tak-
ing a perspective on a problem” or “putting
FIGURE 4 | A grounded cognition perspective on how grounded (modal) symbols are firstly formed based on situated interactions with the external
environment, and later re-enacted as situated simulations, which afford higher-level cognitive processing.
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oneself into another’s shoes” or “grasping a con-
cept” should be taken more literally than they
normally are. This is due to at least two con-
verging factors. First, cognitive abilities develop
on top of the architecture for sensorimotor con-
trol, and the gradual maturation of the latter
constitutes a scaffold for the former. Second,
cognitive abilities re-enact and re-use modal
representations rather than amodal recoding,
and typically reuse existing sensorimotor com-
petences in increasingly more complex cognitive
domains (e.g., visuomotor strategies for prob-
lem solving, Grant and Spivey, 2003) rather
than building novel modularized components.
For these reasons, grounded cognitive processes
have the same power, but also the same con-
straints, as bodily actions, and to understand the
former it is necessary to provide realistic models
of the latter.
Indeed, the grounded approach to model-
ing a cognitive ability begins by considering
the sensorimotor processes that could support
it. For example, a robot could first learn to
spatially navigate, and then learn to reason in
temporal and mathematical domains using its
spatial representations and bodily processes as
a scaffold. This potentially may produce behav-
ior in line with the SNARC effect (cf. Rucinski
et al., 2011). This approach enables incorpo-
rating increasingly more complex constraints as
the tasks become more demanding. For exam-
ple, spatial abilities can be reused to learn social
interaction and joint action tasks. This approach
can reveal how constraints from grounding,
embodiment, and situatedness shape cognition
in the brain. For example, studying language
learning and usage in the context of realis-
tic social interactions can help to explain why
brain regions that are active when processing
objects and actions are also active when nouns
and verbs are comprehended (Pulvermüller,
2005).
Note that although we have mainly empha-
sized psychological processes, computational
models benefit also from the incorporation
of anatomical and neurophysiological con-
straints that help linking grounded theories to
neuronal substrates. One example is the impor-
tance of reentrant loops and efference copies
in neural computational hierarchies (Crapse
and Sommer, 2008), which suggests a possi-
ble way that action streams influence perception
and cognition. Recent EEG evidence has also
shown that early sensory pathways are mod-
ulated by the action associations of objects
and the intentions of the viewer (Goslin et al.,
2012).
COGNITIVE ROBOTICS AS A RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY FOR COMPUTATIONAL GROUNDED
COGNITION
Potentially, many types of computational mod-
els (e.g., connectionist, dynamical systems, and
Bayesian) and “approaches” (see the recent dis-
pute between “normative” and “emergentist”
approaches, Griffiths et al., 2010; McClelland
et al., 2010) are well-suited for modeling
grounded phenomena. Shifting from a theoreti-
cian’s to an engineer’s perspective, one argument
is that the most compelling demonstration of
any theory’s success is: when you build it, does
it work?
A move from purely computational toward
cognitive robotic models could drastically
improve our ability to develop and test
grounded theories of cognition. Cognitive
robotics is a broad research area whose central
aim is realizing complete robotic architectures
that, on the one hand, include principles and
constraints derived from animal and human
cognition and, on the other hand, have realistic
embodiment, sensors and effectors, and learn
to act autonomously in complex, open-ended
(and social). Cognitive robotics enables simul-
taneous consideration of multiple aspects of
grounding, embodiment, and situatedness,
showing how they constrain the development
and expression of cognition. Thus, the benefits
of adopting a cognitive robotics methodology
are multifaceted.
1. Cognitive robotic models are an ideal choice
to incorporate the entire cascade of effects
of grounding, embodiment, and situatedness
(including individual and social scenarios).
2. Cognitive robotics is suitable for experi-
encing environments full of choices, with
numerous sources of rewards and punish-
ments (e.g., manipulation of objects, social
interactions). In turn, this permits linking
behavior and cognitive processing with real-
istic motivational and emotional dynamics.
3. Cognitive robotic models favor unified
design approaches that combine multi-
ple psychological processes (e.g., attention,
memory, action control) in the context of
a specific task. This stands in opposition
to (and usefully complements) the divide-
and-conquermethodology of most empirical
research, which, although useful, runs the
risk of compartmentalizing cognitive phe-
nomena. Cognitive robotics thus can be used
to move beyond isolated models of single
functions to focus on complete architectures
that develop their skills over time.
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4. Cognitive robotics incorporates nicely the
idea that behavior and cognition are orga-
nized around the achievement of goals and
the deployment of actions. The centrality
of action and its linkage with perception
emerge if one considers that for a function-
ing robot, action is also a way to change the
environment in order to steer ensuing stim-
uli and to learn actively. Researchers from
many traditions have emphasized the impor-
tance of learning from (the consequences of)
one’s actions. The goal-centered perspective
could help with linking all cognitive abili-
ties under common computational and neu-
ral processing principles. In this perspective,
representation ability, memory ability, cat-
egorization ability, and attention ability, all
could be ultimately in the service of action
and goal achievement, rather than having
disconnected functions (e.g., vision as a re-
coding of the external world).
5. Cognitive robotic models can have realistic
embodiment and can be used to investigate
the reciprocal influences among the body,
action and perception, such as, for instance,
how action sculpts the body space (Rizzolatti
et al., 1997). Principled approaches to per-
ceptual processing describe the task of the
brain as that of extracting statistical regular-
ities from the sensorium. Cognitive robotics
recognizes that also embodiment and action
are sources of statistical regularities that are
incorporated through learning (Verschure
et al., 2003). Furthermore, embodiment can
alleviate brain processing in multiple ways,
for example by providing solutions to control
problems (Pfeifer and Bongard, 2006), con-
straining choice to a space of possibilities that
is body-scaled (Gibson, 1979), and imple-
menting situated problem-solving strategies
(Kirsh and Maglio, 1994). Note that to study
most of these phenomena the mere posses-
sion of a body is not sufficient, but is nec-
essary to develop realistic models of sensory
processing, action systems, body schema and
awareness (Haggard et al., 2002).
6. Cognitive robotic models are plausible plat-
forms to explore the dynamics of change
and adaptation at the evolutionary and
developmental levels (studied by “develop-
mental” or “epigenetic robotics”). At the
Developmental Robotics
The field of robotics that takes
inspiration from theories of human
development to study the development
of comparable cognitive abilities in
robots. Developmental robotics
ultimately aims at realizing robots that
develop novel abilities by learning from
exploration as well as with the help of
teachers, much like children do.
evolutionary level, this can help us to under-
stand how advanced cognitive skills develop
on top of an existing neural architecture
that solves basic problems of survival and
reproduction (Pezzulo and Castelfranchi,
2007, 2009). At the developmental level,
this can help us to understand how the
progressive maturation at the level of sen-
sorimotor coordination scaffolds the acqui-
sition of cognitive and intellectual skills,
and how the latter remain linked to the
sensorimotor processes that provided scaf-
folding for their development (Rosenbaum
et al., 2001; Thelen and Smith, 1994; von
Hofsten, 2004); see also (Anderson, 2010) for
a discussion of “reuse” of neural substrates
across simpler and more complex abili-
ties. Developmental robotics (specifically
aimed at modeling developmental phenom-
ena, see Cangelosi and Schlesinger, 2013)
offers new ways to investigate this topic in
more detail. For example, it permits manip-
ulating robot knowledge and skills so as
to assess what are the necessary prereq-
uisites for the development of a particu-
lar cognitive ability. Furthermore, it permits
studying the environmental conditions that
facilitate or prevent normal cognitive devel-
opment, and the social dynamics that scaf-
fold language use and culture formation
(Steels, 2003).
CONCLUSIONS: CHALLENGES FOR A NEW
SCIENTIFIC ENTERPRISE
Grounded theories of cognition claim that the
development and expression of cognition is
grounded in sensorimotor processes, affective
states, and bodily strategies; furthermore, cog-
nitive abilities have tight links with the envi-
ronmental and social contexts in which they
were acquired, rather than constituting isolated
modules. A large body of work (reviewed in
Barsalou, 2008) strongly supports this view.
Still, grounded cognition theories lack process
models and computational realizations.
We have proposed a “new alliance” of
grounded cognition and computational mod-
eling toward a novel scientific enterprise:
Computational Grounded Cognition. This joint
initiative requires that both computational
modelers and empiricist adapt their research
methodologies.
Computational modelers should undergo a
“grounded turn”: they should fully incorpo-
rate the key tenets of grounded theories and
increasingly adopt robotic platforms to bet-
ter deal with issues of embodiment, situat-
edness, and development. Modeling grounded
cognition tasks poses a huge multidimensional
problem, as they could potentially incorpo-
rate multiple kinds of constraints (psycho-
logical, anatomical, physiological) and link
to realistic physical and social environments
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(e.g., with human-robot interactions or multi-
agent teams). This requires the elaboration of
novel design methodologies that are multilevel
and isolate sub-problems without losing the rel-
evant directions. One possible starting point
consists of designing functional-level architec-
tures first, which more easily integrate pro-
cessing principles, and then developing models
that are more detailed at the neuronal level
(see Verschure and Althaus, 2003). But clearly,
the advantages of this approach (or the oppo-
site one which starts from neurophysiologi-
cally detailed models) have to be evaluated
in practice. One challenge for Computational
Grounded Cognition is the realization of design
principles that take multiple levels and con-
straints into account and allows researchers
to study many phenomena, but are also spe-
cific enough to avoid losing contact with data
obtained from animal or human experiments.
Empiricists should better incorporate the
“synthetic methodology” of computational
modeling and cognitive robotics within their
own research. To this aim, it is necessary that
good (off-the-shelf) process models of grounded
phenomena become available that experi-
menters can easily incorporate in the design,
operationalization and testing of their theo-
ries and experiments. Success stories already
exist in many fields of psychology and neuro-
science. For example, a family of reinforcement
learning algorithms (e.g., Temporal Difference
Reinforcement Learning, Sutton, 1988) and
statistical methods (e.g., drift diffusion mod-
els, Ratcliff, 1978) are widely used to analyze
neural data and to develop process models of
(perceptual and reward-based) learning and
decision-making. Similarly, the MOSAICmodel
provided a coherent framework for numerous
experiments in computational motor control
and social interaction (Wolpert et al., 2003).
Similar proposals are emerging in the field of
grounded cognition, especially in the dynamic
systems family of models. From this perspec-
tive, cognitive processing does not operate by
using symbols, but rather by the dynamic inter-
actions of multiple processes of perception
and action, which become coupled through
learning and interaction with the environment.
Spivey’s (2007) proposal of continuous attractor
dynamics constitutes a common computational
foundation for numerous studies in attention,
language processing, and reasoning, showing
a continuous interaction between decision-
making and motor execution. Computational
models for the parallel specification and selec-
tion of multiple actions have been proposed
in neuroscience that can explain the mechan-
ics of decision-making and bridge the gap
between simple and abstract choices (Cisek,
2012; Shadlen et al., 2008). Schöner’s (2008)
dynamic field framework is another example of
a widely adopted approach that has the potential
to explain cognitive phenomena at many lev-
els. Important insights might come from recent
advancements in probabilistic approaches to
neural processing, biological learning, and con-
trol, as well (Doya et al., 2007; Friston, 2010;
Shadmehr and Mussa-Ivaldi, 2012). Still, there
is clearly a place for new ideas and ambi-
tious researchers who want to develop better
process models of cognition that have ground-
ing, embodiment, and situatedness at their
core.
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